SCHEME OF MULTI-STEP THEORETICAL-GAME AUCTION OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES WITH POSSIBLE ORIGIN OF CORRUPTION

DOI: 10.36871/ek.up.p.r.2021.09.03.010
UDC 519.6, 519.8

Authors

O. A. MALAFEYEV,
Ph.D., Head of the Department “Modeling of Socio-Economic Systems”, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia
A. A. DEMCHUK,
Ph.D., Associate Professor of the Department of Mathematics, Air Force “Air Force Academy named after Prof. N. E. Zhukovsky and Yu. A. Gagarin”, Voronezh, Russia
S. S. NOVIKOVA,
Ph.D., Associate Professor of the Department of Mathematics, Air Force “Air Force Academy named after Prof. N. E. Zhukovsky and Yu. A. Gagarin”, Voronezh, Russia

Abstract

The game formalizes the game-theoretic model of the first price auction with many employers and em-ployees, implemented in l steps, with the possible occurrence of corruption. The first paragraph presents the statement of the problem, then the first price auction model is formalized with a number of assumptions. Next, corruption that occurs in this model and its effect on the auction process of the first price is considered, com-pared with the case of absence of corruption. At the end of the paper, we consider the statements formalizing the optimal anti-corruption auction scheme.

Keywords

employer, worker, labor exchange, first-price reverse auction, multi-agent interaction, cor-ruption.