THE INFLUENCE OF OIL HANDLING METHODS ASSOCIATED GAS ON ITS SOCIALLY OPTIMAL PRICES

UDC 665.612
DOI: 10.36871/ek.up.p.r.2022.04.01.017

Authors

Ekaterina O. Lobanova,
Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) Moscow, Russia

Abstract

In the 1990s, an unparalleled market for associated petroleum gas was formed in Russia. The monopolist (an oil producing company) acted on the supply side in this market, and the monopsonist (SIBUR company) acted on the demand side.
In the process of development, serious disagreements arose between market participants regarding the cost of associated petroleum gas. As a result of the absence of a positive outcome of negotiations between the monopolist and the monopsonist, the regulator decided to reform the market. In 2002, self-sufficiency prices for CNG separation into components were introduced, and in 2009 the CNG market was liberalized.
In 2016, socially optimal prices for associated petroleum gas were calculated, but turned out to be negative, which could lead to conflict between the participants.
Given this collision the article attempts to modify the model for determining socially optimal prices in order to increase their acceptability for a monopolist.

Keywords

associated petroleum gas, socially optimal price, processing, acceptability, liberalization